A ccountable care organizations (ACOs) are payment models that use a combination of financial incentives and quality measures to focus healthcare spending on evidence-based treatments. [1] [2] [3] [4] Unlike their predecessors of the 1990s, managed care organizations, ACOs incorporate quality measures to help ensure that cost savings focus on discretionary treatments in which the benefits of treatment are low or uncertain rather than indiscriminate limits on care. 5,6 Early reports from pilot ACO implementation projects have described improvements in quality with savings reported in selected regions and populations. 7, 8 
care plans (that similarly shift away from volume incentives) show that specialist staffing levels are traditionally lower, fewer specialist services are used, and physicians are less likely to order discretionary tests under capitation. [15] [16] [17] We hypothesized that the incentives in ACO contracts would encourage providers to selectively limit the use of discretionary cardiovascular care, while maintaining high-quality care, such as nondiscretionary cardiovascular imaging and procedures. However, it remains unknown how ACOs affected specialty-related spending in the pilot programs of the ACO care model. 18, 19 To test this hypothesis, we studied discretionary and nondiscretionary cardiovascular care provided before and after the implementation of Medicare's Physician Group Practice Demonstration Project (PGPD), an ACO pilot project implemented in 2005 for >2 million Medicare beneficiaries served by 10 large healthcare systems. 8 
Methods

Data Sources
We used Medicare administrative fee-for-service claims data from 2001 to 2010 to create treatment and control groups following the regulations set out in the PGPD. 8 We used a 20% sample of Carrier file claims from 2001 to 2005 and 100% of claims from 2006 to 2009. Medicare beneficiaries were assigned to a PGPD participant group if the plurality of their evaluation and management visits came from affiliated PGPD providers. The control groups were composed of Medicare beneficiaries who lived in the same counties as their PGPD counterparts but received their care from non-PGPD providers. 8 Previous studies have reported in greater detail both the structure of the PGPD and methods for replicating the intervention and control groups. 8 
Categories Used to Study Discretionary and Nondiscretionary Imaging and Procedures
We sought to test whether ACOs would limit spending growth for healthcare services in which the benefits to patients are least evident but retain the ability to provide nondiscretionary, evidence-based care. Evidence from other care settings suggests that high-intensity areas tend to provide more discretionary and nondiscretionary care. 20, 21 Therefore, within common cardiovascular conditions, we studied the provision of discretionary and nondiscretionary care, before and after ACO implementation, comparing patients receiving care from PGPD and non-PGPD sites.
We studied 2 common cardiovascular conditions (coronary and carotid atherosclerosis) because these conditions offered the opportunity to examine the treatment of asymptomatic coronary and carotid disease as discretionary conditions. 22, 23 These categories were created based on preexisting, claims-based evidence of symptoms using coding algorithms from previously published reports. 14, 24, 25 For coronary care, we included the following 3 services: (1) stress testing; (2) diagnostic catheterization alone; or (3) catheterization with revascularization procedures, such as stenting or bypass surgery. Each service was coded as nondiscretionary if delivered to patients with recent (<1 year) symptoms of coronary disease and discretionary in all other cases. 26 For example, a cardiac catheterization provided to a patient without any evidence of a broad list of diagnosis codes indicative of symptomatic cardiac disease (see Appendix I in the online-only Data Supplement) would be categorized as "discretionary." Similarly, we examined 4 carotid services: (1) duplex imaging; (2) computed tomography imaging; (3) carotid endartectomy; and (4) stenting. Each of these 4 services was coded as nondiscretionary if delivered to patients with recent (<1 year) symptoms of stroke or transient ischemic attack and discretionary in all other cases. Appendix I describes the International Classification of Diseases, 9th Revision, and current procedural terminology codes used to define the diagnoses and imaging and procedural tests described above. The codes used to define nondiscretionary care were intentionally broad to be conservative in defining imaging and procedural care without these codes as discretionary. However, sensitivity analyses that used narrower coding schema to define nondiscretionary care did not change our study findings.
Based on the coding above, our study design focused on 4 outcomes, measured over the course of a calendar year: (1) the proportion of patients with ≥1 coronary imaging test; (2) the proportion of patients with ≥1 carotid imaging test; (3) the proportion of patients treated with ≥1 invasive coronary revascularization procedure; and (4) the proportion of patients treated with ≥1 invasive carotid revascularization procedure. We studied the first occurrence of a defined imaging test or procedure per beneficiary per year. The denominators used to form these proportions were based on patient populations, with numerators and denominators calculated separately for patients assigned to a PGPD site or local non-PGPD control patients. We estimated effects on each outcome stratified by a patient's status as discretionary or nondiscretionary, yielding 8 distinct outcomes in total.
Difference-in-Difference Study Design and Statistical Analysis
Using a difference-in-difference study design, we examined the use of imaging tests and revascularization procedures among patients receiving care in PGPD and non-PGPD settings before and after ACO implementation. We defined the number of patients attributed to each of the 10 PGPD health systems and their geographically matched controls. By comparing patients in a PGPD site to geographically matched controls over time, the difference-in-difference design, used increasingly in health services and clinical research, 8, 27, 28 controls for fixed differences between PGPD participants and nonparticipants. The characteristics of patients were determined by looking back 1 year in Medicare claims from the date of the imaging test or procedure (Table 1) .
We estimated the differential change in coronary and carotid procedures in 2 steps. For each PGPD site, we estimated patient-level models of our outcomes using linear regression. Each model included an indicator for being attributed to a PGPD participant, an indicator for the post-PGPD period, and an indicator for the interaction of the 2 variables (post × PGPD). The estimate of interest is the coefficient on this interaction term, which describes the differential change in a given outcome at PGPD sites in the postimplementation period compared with controls. If negative, the estimate would indicate that rates of a given imaging or revascularization procedure declined more (or grew more slowly) in PGPD patients compared with controls when comparing the pre-demonstration and post-demonstration periods. Our models adjusted for patient age category, sex, race, interactions between age, sex, and race, Medicaid status, and disability status. We also adjusted for the proportion with income under the federal poverty line in the beneficiary's postal code. To calculate an overall estimate, we averaged site-specific estimates from the 10 PGPD sites, weighting the estimates and variances by the number of beneficiaries assigned to the PGPD site. Residual errors were corrected for clustering at the individual and site-specific levels and within years.
All analyses were performed using SAS (SAS, Cary, NC) and STATA 12 MP (StataCorp, College Station, TX). The Dartmouth Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects approved our research protocol and approved the waiver of need for informed consent.
Results
Patient Characteristics
The intervention group was composed of fee-for-service Medicare patients (n=819 779) receiving cardiovascular care from 10 physician groups participating in a Medicare pilot ACO project, the PGPD. Controls were Medicare patients (n=934 621) from the same regions who received care from non-PGPD physicians. As shown in Table 1 , patients treated within PGPD health systems were similar to patients treated in control health systems for both discretionary and nondiscretionary cardiovascular care in terms of mean age, sex distribution, and comorbidities. Minor differences were statistically significant given our large sample size, but few clinically relevant differences existed between patients at PGPD sites and controls. Although both carotid and coronary patients are aggregated together in Table 1 , when categorized by procedure type and discretionary status, these patient populations again showed only minor differences (see Appendix II in the online-only Data Supplement).
As expected, when compared with patients undergoing nondiscretionary procedures, patients undergoing discretionary imaging or procedures were younger, and a smaller proportion had serious comorbidities, such as diabetes mellitus, chronic renal insufficiency, and congestive heart failure. Among all patients without symptoms of myocardial infarction or stroke, 17.0% (95% confidence interval [CI], 17.01-17.07%) were treated with discretionary coronary imaging, and 27.7% (95% CI, 27.67-27.74%) were treated with discretionary carotid imaging. In terms of discretionary revascularization procedures, 1.4% (95% CI, 1.39-1.41%) of patients were treated with discretionary coronary revascularization, and 0.06% (95% CI, 0.05-0.06%) were treated with discretionary carotid revascularization. Among patients with a history of myocardial infarction or stroke, the proportion of patients treated with imaging was higher, as expected. Overall, 42.6% (95% CI, 42.50-42.68%) of patients with a history of myocardial infarction had coronary imaging, and 68.7% (95% CI, 68.58-68.89%) of patients with stroke had carotid imaging. Similar to the trends seen in imaging, rates of revascularization were higher among patients with symptoms of myocardial infarction or stroke than in patients in whom revascularization was discretionary, ie, they did not have symptoms of myocardial infarction or stroke. For example, 13.2% of patients (95% CI, 13.15-13.28%) with a history of myocardial infarction received coronary revascularization, and 4.3% (95% CI, 4.18-4.32%) of patients with stroke received carotid revascularization.
Trends in Use of Imaging and Revascularization
Cardiovascular imaging use increased over time in both patients treated at PGPD sites and patients treated in non-PGPD sites in the same region (Figure, A) . For example, among all patients with symptomatic coronary disease, rates of coronary imaging increased from 37% (95% CI, 36.78-37.60%) in 2002 to 44% (95% CI, 44.12-44.49%) by 2009 (P<0.0001). Cardiac imaging tests were less common over time but still increased in patients without evidence of myocardial infarction, growing from 14% (95% CI, 13.82-14.11%) of asymptomatic patients in 2002 to 17% (95% CI, 17.48-17.60%) by 2009 (P=0.01). Similar trends were noted in carotid imaging (Figure, A) .
The proportion of patients with a diagnosis of myocardial infarction treated with invasive procedures declined slightly during the study period, ranging from 13.9 (95% CI, 13.6-14.2%) in 2002 to 12.9% (95% CI, 12.8-13.0%) in 2009 (P<0.001), although the proportion treated was slightly higher in patients treated in PGPD hospitals (average difference in PGP versus non-PGPD, 1.3%; 95% CI, 1.23-1.47%; P<0.001; Figure, B ). Invasive carotid revascularization for patients with symptoms of stroke also declined slightly between 2002 and 2009, from 5.6% (95% CI, 5.28-5.93%) to 3.9% (95% CI, 3.74-4.01%; P<0.001). The rates of discretionary cardiovascular procedures remained low and constant throughout the study period. Coronary revascularization procedures were used in <2% of patients without symptoms of myocardial infarction. Similarly, throughout the study period, carotid revascularization was used in <1% of all patients without symptoms of stroke in both PGPD and control sites.
Association Between ACO Implementation and Imaging and Procedure Use in Discretionary and Nondiscretionary Settings
Overall, we found no significant differences in the percentage of patients treated with cardiovascular imaging or procedure use between PGPD and controls before and after ACO implementation. As shown in the Figure (A and B) , there was little evidence of a decline in the proportion of patients treated with discretionary cardiovascular imaging or procedures in PGPD health systems or their controls. The overall difference-in-difference estimate (when comparing the change in use at PGPD versus control sites) was essentially 0 for all imaging tests and procedures studied ( Table 2) . Although these models showed no significant associations with PGPD implementation, we also considered, in relative terms, what the largest possible declines in care use could be given within 95% CIs surrounding our estimates. The largest potential relative reductions within our 95% CIs were a 6% relative decline in nondiscretionary coronary procedures and 16% relative decline for nondiscretionary carotid procedures, suggesting that any change within the confidence bounds of our estimates would imply only modest change. Given these findings, it seemed unlikely that our models have failed to identify any statistically significant, or clinically meaningful, declines in the proportion of patients treated with imaging or procedures associated with ACO implementation.
Finally, although there were no significant overall declines in imaging or procedures with ACO implementation, the effect of implementation was heterogeneous across the 10 PGPD sites (see Appendix III in the online-only Data Supplement). For example, when we studied the use of discretionary carotid imaging, we found that certain sites, such as the Marshfield Clinic, were able to achieve a small but significant decline in imaging use (a decline of 1.6%; 95% CI, -1.7% to -1.5%; P<0.001; see Appendix III in the online-only Data Supplement). However, other health systems, such as the Park Nicollet Clinic, actually performed significantly more discretionary carotid imaging after ACO implementation (an increase of 2.2%; 95% CI, 2.15-2.29%; P<0.001). On balance, reductions in any 1 PGPD site were offset by increasing use in other sites, for an overall association of 0 across the 10 PGPD sites.
Discussion
Specialty care, such as the care of patients with cardiovascular disease, is an important cost center for Medicare patients, and many argue that much of the spending on these services is discretionary in nature. 13, 14 ACO models seek to limit healthcare spending growth. However, we found no evidence to suggest that an early ACO Medicare demonstration had any effect on the use of discretionary cardiovascular care. Our study suggests that better tools and implementation strategies may be necessary to limit growth in discretionary, specialty-related spending under ACO care contracts.
A previous study of the PGPD demonstrated small differences in overall spending before and after ACO implementation, with the exception of spending related to patients dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid. 8 In this analysis, we hypothesized that, although overall spending may have declined only slightly as a result of ACO implementation, spending within cardiovascular care might represent a potential "bright spot" in cost reduction. In addition to being expensive, cardiovascular care has discrete, concrete treatment algorithms for imaging tests and procedures for both symptomatic and asymptomatic cardiovascular disease processes. 26, 29 We hypothesized that cardiovascular care could potentially represent an ideal specialty setting to attempt to limit discretionary procedures, especially those at the margin of plausible benefit. The Marshfield Clinic and the University of Michigan Faculty Group Practice significantly reduced spending overall in the PGPD; although there is some indication of reductions in discretionary use in these practices (eg, the carotid and coronary imaging for Marshfield), the results overall are mixed (see Appendix II in the online-only Data Supplement). 8 Despite the availability of these guidelines and the financial incentives inherent in the ACO payment model, the use of discretionary cardiovascular imaging and procedures did not differ between the sites that participated in the PGPD and comparisons.
Why did the use of discretionary cardiovascular care not decline in ACO settings? Several potential explanations exist. First, the heterogeneity seen across health systems in use changes suggests that variation exists in terms of how each health system approached the goal of achieving savings with the ACO. Studying and learning from those centers that were able to deliver less discretionary care may prove beneficial toward understanding how to effectively achieve savings. Second, our results suggest that initial ACO efforts were targeted at primary care treatment patterns rather than specialists, such as cardiovascular physicians, and services. 30 Participating groups mostly chose to focus their efforts on increasing patient engagement, expanding care management, improving care transitions, and expanding the role of nonphysician providers rather than focusing on specialty care. 31 Third, although the health systems engaged in the PGPD were incentivized to limit spending by the downstream promise of shared savings, it remains unknown whether the incentives of the ACO cardiovascular physicians were similarly aligned. If these physicians typically remained in productivity-based remuneration arrangements, they would have little incentive to limit the use of cardiovascular care. Finally, either PGPD groups or individual physicians may have been unwilling to forego guaranteed imaging or procedure-related payment for the possibility of future savings bonuses. For example, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services estimated hospital payment for percutaneous coronary artery stent placement in 2012 at approximately $16 500. 32 A crude calculation would suggest that, for an individual ACO site, 6 fewer coronary revascularizations would save approximately $100 000, and of this total, $78 400 (savings are calculated over a 2% savings threshold) would be returned to the ACO. However, this "shared savings" would only be realized if (1) the 2% savings threshold was achieved, and (2) the organization had recovered the costs of initial ACO implementation, which averaged $1.7 million across the 10 PGPD participants. 33 Furthermore, because savings are measured in aggregate at the level of the health system, any shared savings generated by any 1 particular specialty (such as cardiovascular care) would result in a downstream reward only if similar efforts were mirrored by other types of specialists in the ACO. In summary, whether or not the savings are "worth it" depends on the perceived probability of receiving savings, the facilities margin for the procedure, and how revenue is shared. Perhaps these potential downstream savings provided too little of an incentive for physicians and hospitals to limit the use of cardiovascular imaging and procedure-based care, typically an upfront profit center for both physicians and hospitals alike. This concern may have been especially salient for the PGPD, a pilot with an uncertain future at its start in 2005. Furthermore, imagine a hypothetical cardiovascular program that generates a profit margin of $1 million per year for a hospital system. This cardiovascular program would have to willingly perform 77 fewer cardiac catheterizations-and forfeit more than $1.26 million in revenue-to generate $1 million in shared savings for their institution. Therefore, incentives that will be adequate to change practice patterns for specialists are unlikely to be trivial in magnitude if fee-for-service payment options remain available.
Nonetheless, policymakers, payers, and healthcare organizations should consider several potential solutions to encourage limiting the use of discretionary specialty care in ACO settings. First, administrative complexities in ACO structures across institutions, which contribute toward greater heterogeneity and higher administrative costs, should be simplified to allow transparency and ease of identification of strategies that effectively reduce spending on discretionary cardiovascular care. Second, although many of the initial attempts at limiting cost growth in ACOs focused on primary care settings, policymakers need to "go where the money is" and prioritize attempts to limit spending growth not only in primary care settings but in the delivery of specialty care as well. Third, healthcare provider organizations will need to align incentives throughout their organization-from administrative targets to individual physician goals-to ensure that the entire system is working toward the same goal of providing value-based care to its patients. Finally, the landscape of ACOs currently operating in the Medicare program is quite diverse; some are large integrated delivery systems, whereas others are made up of solely primary care practices. 34 Effective control of referrals for discretionary care in ACO settings will likely require a uniform approach, although this task will be difficult to design and implement. 35, 36 Is success plausible? We believe that a pathway exists to achieve savings, even in specialty care, in ACO settings. The PGPD differed from the current Medicare Shared Savings Program in important ways. First, attribution was allowed through any physician, not focused around primary care. Second, the savings rate was much higher for practices in the PGPD. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, as mentioned above, the PGPD was temporary in nature and the future of payment reform was unknown. The Medicare Shared Savings Program is a permanent program, and the move away from fee-for-service payment is likely to become broader with time. Going forward, qualitative and quantitative methods will be needed to identify structural, process, and outcome-oriented approaches associated with reduced use of discretionary procedures. If successful strategies are identified and shared with a broader network of providers, it will accelerate the ability of ACOs to limit the use of discretionary cardiovascular care. Because of the small sample size and similarity across participating groups, it is not possible to analyze the characteristics of groups in the PGPD associated with success. Evaluation of the PGP showed some evidence that cost savings and the number of physicians in each network were correlated. 8 Our study has limitations. First, although we studied 2 common cardiovascular conditions, they may not be representative of other types of cardiovascular care associated with the high use of discretionary imaging and procedures, such as the treatment of congestive heart failure or lower-extremity peripheral arterial disease. However, the similarity of findings across 2 disease processes carotid and coronary disease, both discretionary and nondiscretionary, suggests that our findings are likely generalizable. Second, well-described weaknesses exist when applying clinical descriptions to administrative-based analyses. [37] [38] [39] To account for this, the exposures and outcomes selected for our analysis were intentionally common, broadly occurring, and easily identifiable, making a large type II error resultant from poor risk stratification unlikely. Third, although this study of cardiovascular care in the PGPD, which only included a small number of health systems, has a null finding, other ACO implementation projects have shown small savings. 7 Future studies in a much greater number of healthcare systems will be necessary to clearly understand what current ACO programs can and cannot accomplish in limiting the healthcare spending growth, especially for spending related to specialty care.
In conclusion, implementation of pilot ACO payment models did not limit the use of discretionary or nondiscretionary cardiovascular imaging or procedures in 10 large health systems. Future work is needed to see whether ACOs can achieve cost reductions for cardiovascular specialty care within appropriately targeted and incentivized care settings. 
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